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Freedom of Speech, Press and Assembly, and
Freedom of Religion under the Illinois

Constitution
Michael P. Seng*
The first amendment' acts as a limitation on all governmental
action in the United States, whether it be federal, state or local and
as a limitation on private action for, or supported by, the government. 2 Quite literally, our status as the world's greatest democracy
is coterminous with the first amendment. We judge our government and we judge other governments largely on the extent to
which "first amendment" freedoms are recognized and respected.
The first amendment is the bedrock upon which all of our other
liberties are built.3
The central role of the first amendment in protecting freedom of
thought and speech in the United States is of relatively recent origin. As originally drafted and applied, the first amendment limited
only the federal government.4 Although Congress adopted the
fourteenth amendment in 1868 to protect individual liberties from
state interference, the United States Supreme Court continued for
many years to hold that the states were the primary protectors of
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School. The author wishes to thank Professor
Diane Geraghty for her helpful comments and Nils Von Keudell and Robert Volt, students of the John Marshall Law School, for their research assistance.
1. The first amendment to the federal Constitution provides that "Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("the First Amendment has a
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion"); cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) ("freedom of thought, and speech ... is the matrix,
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom"); see also A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948)
(describing why speech on matters of public interest is unregulated in a free society).
4. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). The first major cases dealing
with restrictions by the federal government on freedom of speech did not reach the
Supreme Court until World War I. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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civil liberties.' Not until 1925 did the Supreme Court first consider
whether a state law abridging free speech could violate the first and
fourteenth amendments, 6 and not until the 1940s 7did the Court8
first find state laws to violate the first amendment's free exercise
and establishment of religion 9 clauses. Thus, throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, state constitutional law protected freedom of thought and speech from state interference.
Illinois constitutional law consistently has protected freedom of
thought and speech independently, without questioning the first
amendment's applicability. The first law applicable to the Illinois
territory was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Article I of the
Ordinance provided: "No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his
mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said territories." 10
Article III linked religion with the subject of education: "Religion,
morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and
the happiness of mankind, schools and means of education shall
forever be encouraged."' The Ordinance did not specifically refer
to freedom of speech, press or assembly.
Illinois' first constitution, ratified in 1818, broadly protected the
right to worship according to one's conscience and also provided
that no one shall "be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent." 1 2 These provisions have carried forward to subsequent Illinois Constitutions.' 3 For example, the 1870 Constitution added a
clause specifically forbidding any public funds to be used for sectarian purposes; the 1970 Constitution contains the same provi5. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Slaughter House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
6. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("freedom of speech and of the
press ... are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the State").
7. As applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. U.S. REV. STAT. 15 (2d ed. 1878).
11. Id. Significantly, this provision seems to refer to a type of government sponsored
religion in the schools. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, in People ex
reL. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 342-43, 92 N.E. 251, 253 (1910), "this
ordinance did not impose upon states the duty of religious instruction in the schools
which were to be encouraged." Rather, it recognized "education as a means promotive of
religion and morality by the increase of knowledge." Id. For a further discussion of Ring,
see infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
12. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 3.
13. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. 1, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 3; ILL.
CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 3.

HeinOnline -- 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 92 1989-1990

1989]

Freedom of Speech, Press & Assembly

sion. 14 Each successive Illinois Constitution has contained clauses
protecting freedom of speech,15 press' 6 and assembly.' 7 Thus, regardless of federal law, Illinois citizens have always enjoyed, as a
matter of state constitutional law, the basic freedoms of thought
and speech.
I.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION FROM
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

When the legion of cases litigated under the first amendment are
considered, it is surprising to notice the dearth of cases litigated
under the comparable provisions of the Illinois Constitution. The
nineteenth century produced very few reported cases at either the
federal level under the first amendment or the state level under the
freedom of speech and thought provisions of the Illinois Constitution. The explanation for this is unclear. It may be that government did not touch most people's lives much, and when
government regulation infringed upon rights, people were more
likely to resort to political rather than to judicial remedies. Or, it
may be that nineteenth century citizens were less sensitive to free
thought and free speech issues and that attorneys were less available to litigate these types of claims.
After the 1920s, the first amendment was available to use as a
check on state and local power.' 8 Because federal judges are more
insulated from political and parochial pressures than their counterparts in state courts, litigants probably felt comfortable framing
their complaints to allege federal constitutional violations in federal courts.' 9 Also, the eloquence of such federal judges as
Holmes, Brandeis, Black and Douglas may have caused lawyers
and litigants to automatically associate speech and religion issues
with the first amendment, thereby neglecting similar provisions in
their own state constitutions.
The absence of suits alleging violations of the Illinois Constitu14.

See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. X, § 3; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 3.
15. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 4; ILL.
CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 23; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 22.
16. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 4; ILL. CONST.
of 1848, art. XIII, § 23; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 22.
17. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 17; ILL.
CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 21; ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 19.
18. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
19. See Seng, Federalism, the Courts and Individual Liberties, 75 ILL. BAR J. 310
(1987) (stressing the value of an independent federal judiciary in upholding the protection
of individual freedoms).
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tions does not mean that free speech and freedom of religion issues
have not arisen in Illinois. Since the 1920s, Illinois has spawned
many of the most important precedents decided by the United
States Supreme Court under the first amendment. 20 All of these
issues could have been litigated under the Illinois Constitution, but
in many of these cases, state law based claims were ignored.
Beginning in 1977 with the publication of Justice Brennan's
Harvard Law Review article, "State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,"' 2' there has been a rethinking of state
constitutional law throughout the United States,22 and some state
courts have expanded state constitutional protections beyond those
provided in the federal Constitution. 23 Although the 1970 Illinois
Constitution contains one of the most progressive bill of rights in
the nation, the Illinois Supreme Court has not been a leader in this
rethinking process 24 This may be caused, in part, by many lawyers
who continue to think in terms of federal rights and who have pro20. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (picketing); Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (solicitation); National Socialist Party
v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (marching); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(picketing); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (demonstrations); Organization
for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (distribution of literature); Gregory v.
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (marching); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967) (association); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (thought); Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (motion picture censorship); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (speech); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (speech);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religion).
21. 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
22. See, e.g., Mosk, The Power ofState Constitutionsin ProtectingIndividual Rights, 8
N. ILL. L. REV. 651 (1988); Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985); Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw. The Williamsburg Conference (1985) (cosponsored by
Conference of Chief Justices, National Center for State Courts).
23. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Ala. 1977) (right to attorney at preindictment lineup); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal.3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576
(1981), superceded by statute as stated in People v. Morehead, 197 Cal. App.3d 292, 238
Cal. Rptr. 570 (1981) (right to attorney); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929,
135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977) (equal protection); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (equal protection); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973) (equal protection).
24. See McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and our Independent Legal Tradition: A
Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 1 (1987). The 1970 Illinois
Constitution specifically expands protection by prohibiting unreasonable "invasions of
privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means,"
ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 6; prohibiting discrimination in employment or in the sale
of rental of housing, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 17; prohibiting the state and local
governments from discriminating on account of sex, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 17;
prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of property or in employment on the basis
of a physical or mental handicap, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 19; and prohibiting communications inconsistent with human dignity, ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 20.

HeinOnline -- 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 94 1989-1990

1989]

Freedom of Speech, Press & Assembly

vided little critical analysis of their own state's bill of rights.25
Most of the Illinois cases that have addressed whether the Illinois bill of rights provides protections different from the federal
Bill of Rights have involved criminal prosecutions.26 By holding
many state practices involving searches and seizures and the privilege against self-incrimination to violate the fourth and fifth
amendments to the federal Constitution, courts have rendered interpretation of state constitutional provisions irrelevant.2" Recent
United States Supreme Court opinions have eroded some of the
protections accorded to criminal defendants under the fourth and
fifth amendments. Thus, the question has arisen whether the Illinois Constitution could provide greater protection than the federal
Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court has approached this
question with considerable caution.
In one of the first cases that presented an opportunity for the
Illinois Supreme Court to take an independent stance, the court
elected to follow the United States Supreme Court. In People v.
Rolfingsmeyer,28 the court addressed whether article I, section 10
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which provides protection against
self-incrimination, is broader than the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution. The court held that the Illinois law
requiring a driver to submit to a breath test for intoxication vio25. See State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 1985). In Jewett, the Vermont
Supreme Court chided attorneys for inadequately analyzing and arguing state constitutional issues and ordered the attorneys in a pending case to file supplemental briefs on the
state constitutional issues presented, stating "[tihis generation of Vermont lawyers has
an unparalleled opportunity to aid in the formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will protect the rights and liberties of our people, however the philosophy of
the United States Supreme Court may ebb and flow." Id.
26. See infra notes 28-45.
27. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). See infra note 164 and accompanying text (for additional
discussion of Robins). Because the Federal Constitution establishes the base for the protection of individual rights, the Illinois Supreme Court has reversed the normal order of
deciding state issues prior to deciding federal issues. The court first decides whether an
Illinois law violates federal constitutional rights. If it does, then the court will find it
unnecessary to determine whether the law also offends the Illinois Constitution. Chicago
Tribune Co. v. Downers Grove, 125 Ill. 2d 468, 472, 532 N.E.2d 821, 822 (1988). The
Oregon Supreme Court, which has a tradition of independence in deciding state constitutional issues, has taken the opposite approach and has held that state courts have a duty
to determine state constitutional issues before they tackle federal constitutional issues.
Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 298 Or. 471, 495, 695 P.2d 25, 34
(1985) (holding that certain religious schools could be taxed to support unemployment
benefits). See also State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987) (holding that obscenity
is a form of speech protected by the Oregon Constitution).
28. 101 Il. 2d 137, 461 N.E.2d 410 (1984).
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lated neither the fifth amendment nor article I, section 10.29
Furthermore, it found that the Record of Proceedings for the Sixth
Illinois Constitutional Convention reflected a general recognition
and acceptance
of Supreme
Court fifth amendment
30
interpretations.
In a special concurring opinion, Justice Simon argued that the
Illinois courts have an obligation to take an independent look at
the Illinois Constitution and, in doing so, are not limited to United
States Supreme Court precedents.3 He suggested that even
though "the language of the self-incrimination clause in the Illinois
Constitution is almost identical to the comparable clause in the
federal Constitution, it does not follow it must have the same
32
content.
Not long after, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a warrantless
search of an arrestee, after his arrest for a traffic violation, under
the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 6 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.33 Once again the
court presumed an interdependent construction between the Illinois and federal constitutions and found that "[t]he constitutional
debates do not indicate any wish or intent to provide protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures broader than those existing under decisional interpretations under the fourth amend' ' 34
ment to the United States Constitution.
When the court confronted a case requiring it to assess the reliability of an informant's tip used to secure a search warrant, it again
chose to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead. In People
v. Tisler,31 the court adopted the totality-of-circumstances approach enunciated in Supreme Court's Illinois v. Gates36 decision.
29. Id. at 142, 461 N.E.2d at 412.
30. Id. at 142, 461 N.E.2d at 412-13 (citing RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1376-80 (1970)). This convention drafted the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
31. Id. at 145, 461 N.E.2d at 414 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
32. Id. at 146, 461 N.E.2d at 415 (Simon, J., specially concurring). According to
Justice Simon, similar language in the federal and state constitutions rather "indicates
that the intention was to protect the same interests.
... Id.
33. People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 461 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840
(1984).
34. Id. at 218, 461 N.E.2d at 945. Justice Clark dissented on the ground that the
Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure invalidated the search. Id. at 225-28, 461 N.E.2d at
949-50 (Clark, J., dissenting). Justice Simon again dissented on the ground that the Illinois Supreme Court has an independent obligation to interpret its own bill of rights. Id.
at 236, 461 N.E.2d at 954 (Simon, J., dissenting).
35. 103 I11.2d 226, 252-53, 69 N.E.2d 147, 160 (1984).
36. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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In a special concurring opinion, Justice Clark argued that the Illinois courts should not be precluded from protecting the individual
liberties of Illinois citizens should the United States Supreme
Court consistently decide to favor police efficiency over the rights
of the accused.37 Speaking for the majority, Justice Ryan disagreed
and established what has become known as the "lockstep"
doctrine:
After having accepted the pronouncements of the [United States]
Supreme Court in deciding fourth amendment cases as the appropriate construction of the search and seizure provisions of the
Illinois Constitution for so many years, we should not suddenly
change course and go our separate way simply to accommodate
the desire of the defendant to circumvent what he perceives as a
narrowing of his fourth amendment rights under the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois v. Gates. Any variance between the
Supreme Court's construction of the provisions of the fourth
amendment in the Federal Constitution and similar provisions in
the Illinois Constitution must be based on more substantial
grounds. We must find in the language of our constitution, or in
the debates and the committee reports of the constitutionalconvention, something which will indicate that the provisions of our constitution are intended to be construed differently than are similar
provisions in the Federal Constitution, after which they are
patterned.3 8
Not until 1988, in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce,3 9 did the Illinois

Supreme Court conclude that comparable provisions in the Illinois
and federal constitutions have independent meanings. The Joyce
court addressed whether the state could request a jury trial in a
criminal case after the defendant had waived his right to a jury
trial. 4° The United States Supreme Court previously had upheld a
federal rule that allowed the prosecutor to request a jury trial over
the defendant's objection. 4 In Joyce, the Illinois court stated that
language in the 1970 Illinois Constitution, as well as in the
drafter's debates, distinguished the "right to a jury trial" provisions in the Illinois Constitution from those in the federal Constitution. This difference, according to the court, was "one of substance
and not merely one of form. "42
The court also determined that the committee proposals, the
37.

Tisler, 103 Il. 2d at 259, 469 N.E.2d at 164 (Clark, J., specially concurring).

38.
39.

Id. at 245, 469 N.E.2d at 157 (emphasis added).
126 Ill.
2d 209, 533 N.E.2d 873 (1988).

40.

Id. at 211-12, 533 N.E.2d 874.

41.
42.

Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
Joyce, 126 Ill.
2d at 214, 533 N.E.2d at 875.
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floor debates and the explanation to the voters indicated no intent
to change the right to trial by jury as that right was enjoyed in
Illinois at the time of the 1970 Constitutional Convention.43 In
1970, Illinois law viewed the waiver of a jury as a constitutionally
protected personal right of the defendant. 44 Although concurring
in result, Justice Clark argued against the majority's lockstep approach to constitutional construction:
Instead of assuming that similar State and Federal provisions are
to be construed similarly, we could simply assume that all State
constitutional provisions are to be construed independently of
their Federal counterparts. By 'independently' I do not mean
that the State constitutional provision must in every instance be
given a broader or more liberal construction. All I mean is that
as to our State constitutional provisions, Federal precedents are
not stare decisis. They are persuasive and not determinative.
Where their reasoning persuades us, we should follow them.
Where they do not, we should not.45
Despite its ruling in Joyce, a majority of the Illinois Supreme
Court continues to take a narrow approach toward Illinois constitutional interpretation. At least in criminal cases, the court will
follow the United States Supreme Court's lead, unless the language
or history of the Illinois provision counsels a different result. The
alternative approach urged by Justices Simon and Clark is more
consistent with the Founding Father's envisionment of the states'
important role in protecting individual liberties.
II.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE ILLINOIS
46
CONSTITUTION

A.

Legislative History

The legislative history of the freedom of religion provisions in
43. Id. at 215, 533 N.E.2d at 875-76.
44. Id. at 222, 533 N.E.2d at 879.
45. Id. at 225, 533 N.E.2d at 880 (Clark, J., concurring).
46. As compared to the first amendment, the Illinois Constitution is quite detailed
with regard to freedom of religion. See ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 3 and art. X, § 3.
For example, article I, section 3 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed, and no person shall be denied any
civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense
with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. No person shall be required
to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of
worship.
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the Illinois Constitution is minimal. Their precursor, the Northwest Ordinance, had protected persons who conducted themselves
in a peaceable or ordinary manner from being molested on account
of their mode of worship or religious sentiments." This provision
was similar to that found in some of the colonial documents securing religious freedom.48
The broader provisions included in sections 3 and 4 of the 1818
Illinois Constitution were similar to provisions found in other
states' earlier constitutions.4 9 Delegates to the 1847 Convention
made several proposals to amend section 4, which prohibited religious tests as a qualification for public office. The delegates defeated a proposal to add a clause to section 4, which stated "no
person shall be deprived of any of his rights, privileges or capacities, or disqualified from the performance of any of his public or
private duties, or rendered incompetent to give evidence in any
court of law or equity, in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion." 50 The delegates similarly defeated a rider that
provided "that the civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen shall in no-wise be diminished or enlarged on account of religion."'" They also rejected proposals to disqualify persons from
holding public office or employment or from being competent witILL. CONST. of 1970, art. I, § 3. Article II, section 3 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution was
identical. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 3.
Article XIII, sections 3 and 4 of the 1848 Illinois Constitution are identical to article
VIII, sections 3 and 4 of the 1818 Illinois Constitution:
§ 3. That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty
God according to the dictates of their own consciences; that no man can of
right be compelled to attend, erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent; that no human authority can, in any case
whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and that no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of
worship.
§ 4. That no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under this state.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, §§ 3, 4; ILL CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, §§ 3, 4.
47. Northwest Ordinance, art. I (1787), reprinted in U.S. REV. STAT. 15 (2d ed.
1878). See supra note 10 and accompanying text (text of article I).
48. E.g., Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, para. 2 (1663) ("noe
person within the sayd colonye, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of our sayd colony").
49. See, e.g., Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State,
§ II (1776) reprinted in DEL. CODE ANN. vol. 1, at 109 (1975); CONST. OF PA. of 1776,
§ II. See also J. CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970 (1972).
50. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1847 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Aug. 23,
1847, reprintedin THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, 854-55 (A.C. Cole ed. 1919)
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS IN 1847].
51. Id. at 855.
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nesses in any court proceeding in the state if they denied the existence of God or had religious views incompatible with the freedom
or safety of the state.5 2 The defeat of these proposals gives us little
insight beyond that the delegates generally must have been satisfied
with the protections contained in sections 3 and 4.
The debates in the 1869-70 Convention were more lively. 3 One
delegate argued that sections 3 and 4 of the 1848 Constitution
should be retained "as is":
They are comprehensive, clear, one-fourth shorter, and protect
the religious liberty of every citizen of the State, beyond peradventure. They make the declaration broadly, without any proviso or 'if' or 'and,'5 and
leave no excuse for future generations to
4
persecute anybody.
The delegates, however, redrafted the provisions securing religious
freedom, with many objecting to the qualification placed on liberty
of conscience that exempted licentiousness and other acts inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.55
Supporters of the limitation on freedom of conscience argued
that groups like the Mormons should not be permitted to come to
Illinois to practice polygamy and other licentiousness. 56 Delegates
debated at length whether religion meant only the "Christian" religion and whether non-Christian religions were to be included and,
if so, how the term "religion" was to be defined. 57 The convention
defeated a proposal to protect all opinion, not merely "religious"
opinion. 58
The 1870 Constitution contained a new provision specifically
prohibiting the expenditure of public funds for sectarian purposes.5 9 This provision was included in the education article and
52.
53.

Id.
2 DEBATES

AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS OF 1869-70, 1559-67 (1870) [hereinafter DEBATES OF 1870].

54. Id. at 1563.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1560, 1564-65. The constitutions of California, New York and New Hampshire contained limitations on freedom of conscience.
57. Id. at 1560, 1563-64.
58. Id. at 1565-66. The Illinois Supreme Court later interpreted the 1870 Constitution to do away with religious tests. Hroneck v. People, 134 Ill. 139, 152-53, 24 N.E. 861,
865 (1890) (under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, "there is no longer any test or qualification in respect to religious opinion or belief, or want of the same, which affects the competency of citizens to testify as witnesses in courts of justice.")
59. Article VIII, section 3 provided that:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, township, school
district, or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay
from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, uni-

HeinOnline -- 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 100 1989-1990

1989]

Freedom of Speech, Press & Assembly

not in the bill of rights. 6° The delegates rejected a proposal to substitute language patterned after the first amendment 6' and, after
spirited debate, one that would have prevented school officials
from excluding the Bible from schools.62
The language or interpretation of the first amendment played no
real part in the debates about religious freedom in these earlier
constitutional conventions. Reference to "other constitutions" was
inevitably to other state constitutions. Nothing in the Illinois provisions' language or in the constitutional debates leading to their
adoption would cause one to conclude that Illinois simply should
adopt the federal model or that Illinois courts should blindly follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the first amendment when interpreting the Illinois Constitution's
freedom of religion clauses.
The 1970 Illinois Constitution adopted without modification the
freedom of religion clauses in the 1870 Constitution. In an analysis
of the 1870 Illinois Constitution prepared for the Illinois Constitution Study Commission in 1969,63 George D. Braden and Rubin G.
Cohn commented upon the more detailed language regarding freedom of religion in the Illinois Constitution as compared to the federal Constitution. They speculated that it was unlikely any of the
specific limitations in article I, section 3 went "beyond the more
versity, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled by any church or
sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of land,
money, or other personal property ever be made by the state, or any such public
corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.
ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VIII, § 3.
60. The provision is similar to the prohibition against public funding for sectarian
schools found in the 1846 New York Constitution. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. IX. The
New York constitutional provision was adopted in reaction to requests by Catholics for
public funds for parochial schools. Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64
WASH.L.REV. 73, 91-92 (1989). A similar amendment was proposed for the Federal
Constitution in 1875. The so-called "Blaine Amendment" would have prohibited state
funds from being used to support sectarian schools. The House and Senate debates reflected a pronounced anti-Catholic bias. 4 CONG. REC. 5580, 5587-91 (1876). For further discussion of the New York Constitution, see infra notes 70, 135, 163 and
accompanying text.
61. 1 DEBATES OF 1870, supra note 53, at 62. In Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill.
2d
448, 474, 299 N.E.2d 737, 750 (1973) (Ryan, J., concurring), Justice Ryan stated that the
rejection of this proposal "as a substitute for section 3 of Article VIII indicates to me that
the framers of the constitution of 1870 did not intend that this section have the same
meaning as the first amendment but that it be more restrictive insofar as public aid to
sectarian schools is concerned." For further discussion of Bakalis, see infra notes 100-07,
110 and accompanying text.
62. 2 DEBATES OF 1870, supra note 53, at 1739-45, 1749-58.
63.
G. BRADEN & R. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1969).
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general First Amendment's proscription on governmental
power." 6 Nonetheless, they saw "the merit of defining with a fair
degree of certainty the essential principles of religious freedom
while expressing the principle of a reserved governmental power to
protect the public interest."65
Braden and Cohn suggested that the Illinois Supreme Court's
interpretation of article VIII, section 3 seemed to allow more public support of sectarian institutions than might be permitted under
the first amendment.66 Additionally, they urged the delegates to
take a fresh look at article VIII, section 3 and not to "abdicate" to
the Bill of Rights simply because it might provide comparable
protection.67

On several occasions in the convention debates, delegates raised
as an issue the relationship of the Illinois religion provisions to the
first amendment. In response to a question whether article I, section 3 should be read the same as the first amendment, Leonard
Foster, a delegate on the Bill of Rights Committee, noted that "if
anything, this provision is somewhat more restrictive than the one
in the Federal constitution."68 Yet, when asked whether the courts
had read section 3 the same as the first amendment, Foster replied,
"It was our feeling that they were closely parallel, but not necessarily exactly the same." 6
More debate took place over the provision prohibiting public aid
for sectarian purposes, currently found in article X, section 3 of the
1970 Constitution. New York's experience made an impact on the
delegates and provided the reason for their decision to retain the
language of the 1870 Constitution. The New York Constitution
was similar to the Illinois Constitution, but it was changed to read
like the first amendment. Fearing that this change signaled the
allowance of greater aid to sectarian schools in the future, voters in
New York defeated the entire constitution. 70
In Illinois, the issues surrounding article X, section 3 were similarly controversial. Betty Howard, a delegate on the Education
Committee, reviewed the options available to the Committee and
commented:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 16. But see infra text accompanying note 68.
G. BRADEN & R. COHN, supra note 63, at 18.
Id. at 405-08. See infra text accompanying notes 70-77.
G. BRADEN & R. COHN, supra note 63, at 408-09.
3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
VENTION 1372 (1972) (verbatim transcripts) [hereinafter RECORD OF 1970].
69. Id. at 1373.
70. Id. at 780. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 102 1989-1990

CON-

Freedom of Speech, Press & Assembly

1989]

Thus, our Education Committee decided to retain the present
language and leave it unchanged in the belief that the present
language is no more restrictive than the federal language, but
rather it yields the same substantive results. Any program which
is constitutional under the federal establishment clause is constitutional under the present wording of article VIII, section 3.
Whether any particular program constitutes "aid" or "support"
for prohibited sectarian purposes or is in the furtherance of nonsectarian purposes is a factual matter to be left to court
determination. 7
She conceded that some legal experts held the position that the
Illinois language was less restrictive than the first amendment.7 2
Other delegates did not want to be too specific about the meaning
of article X, section 3 and preferred to leave its construction to the
courts. Voicing his disagreement with the Committee report's interpretation, Delegate Bernard Weisberg commented:
I do not believe that this Convention has authority to make any
statement about the intention of the present constitutional provision which will be entitled to any weight in the courts. If, however, the courts do, some day, look to our debates, they should
note that many of the delegates who vote today to retain Article
VIII, Section 3, do so because we believe that it means what it
says, and because we believe that it expresses wise policy.7 3
The debates concerning the relationship between the Illinois provisions on religious freedom and the first amendment must be
viewed in their historical context. The Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention occurred at the end of the Warren Court era, a time
when the United States Supreme Court had given perhaps the most
expansive scope to the federal protection of individual liberties in
that institution's long history. The delegates recognized that the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the first amendment's establishment clause was more restrictive than the Illinois Supreme Court's
interpretation of article VIII, section 3 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. The delegates premised their comments about the relationship between the Illinois provisions and the federal provisions on
that understanding.
The delegates also had to confront whether the Illinois provisions' interpretation would be changed if the United States
Supreme Court changed its interpretation of the first amendment.
In response to a question whether a decision by the Supreme Court
71.
72.
73.

6 RECORD
Id. at 781.
Id. at 845.

OF

1970, at 780-81 (committee proposals).
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in Lemon v. Kurtzman7 4 would furnish a construction for article
X, section 3, Delegate Malcolm Kamin responded:
We would have no express guideline except - and as the committee can only do - to the extent that our legal experts have said
that the great likelihood is that the United States Supreme Court
is going to be followed by the Illinois Supreme Court because of
the similar past interpretations of the language. We can presume
that they probably will follow the United States Supreme Court.
There is no compulsion upon them to do so except as they are
passing upon the matter as a federal question."
Kamin's response prompted a question as to whether article X,
section 3 was a potential time bomb. If federal decisions became
less restrictive, the Illinois Supreme Court still could hold that article X, section 3 prohibited public aid to sectarian schools. Kamin
acknowledged this possibility.76 An effort to prevent this result by
deleting article X, section 3 from the Illinois Constitution failed.77
B. Illinois Supreme Court Decisions
1. Pre-1970
Illinois Supreme Court decisions prior to 1970 show the court's
willingness to grapple with the difficult legal issues presented in
freedom of religion cases. In an early case involving both article
II, section 3 and article VIII, section 3 of the 1870 Constitution,
complainants sought to strike down a law that permitted the directors of a public school to allow a school house, when not occupied
as a school, to be used "for religious meetings and Sunday schools,
for evening schools and for literary societies, and for such other
meetings as the directors may deem proper. ' 78 The court held that
the law allowing an incidental use of the building that did not in74. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon was then pending and subsequently has supplied the
legal framework for all establishment clause debate under the first amendment. The action challenged the constitutionality of state aid to, or for the benefit of, nonpublic
schools. The Court's opinion in Lemon provides the analysis for cases involving state aid
to religious schools. For further discussion of Lemon, see infra notes 103, 111 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the meaning of article 3, § 4 see infra note
102 and accompanying text.
75. RECORD OF 1970, supra note 68, at 787.
76. Id. at 788.
77. Id. at 841-55. The effort to delete article X, section 3, failed by a 35 to 79 vote.
Id. at 854.
78. Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Ill. 61, 62 (1879) (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
122, para. 39 (1874)). Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Supreme Court rejected the defendant's separation of church and state defense under the first amendment
and held that a university could not bar a group that wanted to use its facilities for
religious worship and discussion).
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terfere with school purposes did not violate article VIII, section 3.
The law conferred only an incidental benefit on religion and,
hence, did not compel anyone to contribute without consent to the
support of a ministry or place of worship.7 9 In a subsequent case,
the court held that in order to hold public school, a board of education could temporarily lease the basement of a Catholic church
so long as the board continued to control the school, to select the
teachers, and to prescribe the system of instruction. 0
In Reichwald v. Catholic Bishop,8 ' the Illinois Supreme Court
held that article VIII, section 3 did not forbid a county from allowing the Catholic bishop to erect a chapel on a poor farm located
on county land to be used for religious worship and funeral services. The bishop was to pay for the chapel, but the title to the
building was to vest in the county. The court held that the county
did not make a grant or donation but only a license to construct a
building and permission, revocable at any time, to have religious
and funeral services in the building. 2
Perhaps the most important case interpreting article VIII, section 3, Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School for Girls,13 involved a
request for an injunction to prevent the county from paying for the
care and maintenance of girls committed by the juvenile court to a
school under the Roman Catholic Church's control and management. All of the girls committed to the school were members of
the Church. The school received fifteen dollars a month for each
girl, less than it cost the state to maintain children in state institutions. The school's cost per girl exceeded fifteen dollars, an
amount made up by donations, largely from the archbishop. In
upholding the grant, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
[t]he constitutional prohibition against furnishing aid or preference to any church or sect is to be rigidly enforced, but it is contrary to fact and reason to say that paying less than the actual
cost of clothing, medical care and attention, education and training in useful arts and domestic sciences, is aiding the institution
where such things are furnished.84
Relying solely on the 1870 Illinois Constitution, the Illinois
79.
80.
81.

Nichols, 93 Ill. at 63.
Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 IIl. 297, 10 N.E. 669 (1887).
258 Ill. 44, 101 N.E. 266 (1913).

82.

Id. at 48, 101 N.E. at 267.

83. 280 Ill. 613, 117 N.E. 735 (1917).
84. Id. at 618, 117 N.E. at 737. The delegates to the 1970 Convention were warned
that the Dunn decision was probably less restrictive and therefore may conflict with more
recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the First Amendment.
BRADEN & R. COHN, supra note 63, at 405-08.
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Supreme Court banned Bible reading in the public schools more
than fifty years before the United States Supreme Court did so
under the first amendment.85 In People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Education,86 members of the Roman Catholic faith objected to Bible reading, the singing of hymns and the repeating of the Lord's
prayer in the public schools. 87 The court recognized that "[t]he
free enjoyment of religious worship includes freedom not to worship."' 8 The court reviewed the constitutional provisions and
court decisions of a number of states and finally concluded that
"the exercises mentioned in the petition constitute religious worship and the reading of the Bible in the school constitutes sectarian
instruction" in violation of the Illinois Constitution. 9
85. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
86. 245 Il1. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910). See infra notes 95, 175 and accompanying text
(additional discussion of Ring).
87. The claim alleged that this conduct violated the first amendment, article II, section 3 and article VIII, section 3 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
88. Id. at 340, 92 N.E. at 252.
89. Id. at 352, 92 N.E. at 257. The Illinois Supreme Court eloquently described the
relationship between religion and the state:
It is true that this is a Christian State. The great majority of its people adhere
to the Christian religion. No doubt this is a Protestant State. The majority of
its people adhere to one or another of the Protestant denominations. But the
law knows no distinction between the Christian and the Pagan, the Protestant
and the Catholic. All are citizens. Their civil rights are precisely equal. The
law cannot see religious differences, because the constitution has definitely and
completely excluded religion from the law's contemplation in considering men's
rights. There can be no distinction based on religion. The State is not, and
under our constitution cannot be, a teacher of religion. All sects, religious or
even anti-religious, stand on an equal footing. They have the same rights of
citizenship, without discrimination. The public school is supported by the taxes
which each citizen, regardless of his religion or his lack of it, is compelled to
pay. The school, like the government, is simply a civil institution. It is secular,
and not religious, in its purposes. The truths of the Bible are the truths of
religion, which do not come within the province of the public school. No one
denies their importance. No one denies that they should be taught to the youth
of the State. The constitution and the law do not interfere with such teaching,
but they do banish theological polemics from the schools and school districts.
This is done, not from any hostility to religion, but because it is no part of the
duty of the State to teach religion, - to take the money of all and -apply it to
teaching the children of all the religion of a part, only. Instruction in religion
must be voluntary. Abundant means are at hand for all who seek such instruction for themselves or their children. Organizations whose purpose is the
spreading of religious knowledge and instruction exist, and many individuals, in
connection with such organizations and independently, are devoted to that
work. Religion is taught, and should be taught, in the churches, Sunday
schools, parochial and other church schools and religious meetings. Parents
should teach it to their children at home, where its truths can be most effectively enforced. Religion does not need an alliance with the State to encourage
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With Ring as ammunition, complainants attacked many other
school boards' policies. In People ex rel Latimer v. Board of Education,9° the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a school board policy
allowing pupils to be excused for one hour each week to attend
religious instruction off the school grounds. The court rejected arguments based on the first amendment, article II, section 3 and
article VIII, section 3 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. 9' Distinguishing Ring,92 the court stated that, "[t]here is no charge that the
action of the school board here is discriminatory or that any particular denomination or religious faith is favored, or that any part of
the religious
instruction is held in the schoolroom or on school
'3
property. "
In another case, the Illinois Supreme Court also held that it did
not violate the Illinois Constitution to invite outside teachers into
the public schools to offer religious instruction during the hours
when the public schools were regularly in session. 94 The school
administration did not require the students to attend the classes,
and the school board provided no moneys in connection with the
classes. The court again distinguished Ring,95 this time reasoning
that the classes were voluntary and not part of the public school
program. 96 The court instead found the program to be analogous
in all respects to the program upheld in Latimer.97 Any incidental
expense connected to the program was de minimis and, hence, did
its growth. The law does not attempt to enforce christianity. Christianity had
its beginning and grew under oppression. Where it has depended upon the
sword of civil authority for its enforcement it has been weakest. Its weapons are
moral and spiritual and its power is not dependent upon the force of a majority.
It asks from the civil government only impartial protection and concedes to
every other sect and religion the same impartial civil right. 'United with government, religion never rises above the merest superstition; united with religion,
government never rises above the merest despotism; and all history shows us
that the more widely and completely they are separated the better it is for both.'
Id. at 349-50, 92 N.E. at 255-56 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211
(1872)).
90. 394 I1. 228, 68 N.E.2d 305 (1946).
91. Id.
92. 245 Ill.
334, 92 N.E. 251.
93. Latimer, 394 I11.
at 234, 68 N.E.2d at 309. The United States Supreme Court
reached the same result under the First Amendment in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952).
94. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E.2d 161 (1947),
rev'd, 333 U.S. 203 (148). See infra note 99 and accompanying text (for additional discussion of McCollum).
95. 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251.
96. McCollum, 396 Ill. at 20-21, 71 N.E.2d at 164.
97. Id. at 23, 71 N.E.2d at 165.
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not violate article VIII, section 3.98 Although the Illinois Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Illinois Constitution was final, its interpretation of the first amendment was not, and the United States
Supreme Court ultimately held that the program violated the establishment clause of the first amendment.99
All of these cases are significant because the Illinois Supreme
Court gave careful analysis to the Illinois constitutional provisions
at issue. Eschewing rigid tests and slogans, the court pragmatically
considered the facts of each case against the language used in the
Illinois Constitution.
2.

After 1970

Since 1970, the Illinois Supreme Court has shown less independence from the United States Supreme Court. In Board of Education v. Bakalis,1°° the court considered the constitutionality of a
state law that required a school board to provide the same transportation along its regular school bus routes for non-public school
pupils as it did for public school pupils. The plaintiffs argued that
the school busing law violated article I, section 3 because it granted
a preference to Catholic schools, the chief beneficiaries of the law.
The Illinois Supreme Court took its cue from the United States
Supreme Court' 01 and held that the opinion expressed by the Education Committee of the Sixth Constitutional Convention, as well
as the understanding of the convention and of the voters who
adopted the 1970 Constitution, was that the Illinois school busing
law did not violate article X, section 3.102 Refusing to apply any
98. Id. at 24-25, 71 N.E.2d at 165-66.
99. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ("This is beyond all question a
utilization of the tax established and tax supported public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith.")
100. 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973). See supra note 61 and accompanying text
(for addditional discussion of Bakalis).
101. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) holding that governmental reimbursement to parents for the transportation of students to and from parochial schools
does not violate the first amendment).
102. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d at 464-65, 299 N.E.2d at 745. The Illinois Supreme Court
quoted at length the Committee on Education's report. Id. at 462-64, 299 N.E.2d at 74445. The report stated in part that:
The Committee is of the opinion that the Illinois Supreme court in the cases of
Dunn v. Chicago IndustrialSchool for Girls [281 I11.352, 117 N.E. 993 (1917)],
Trost v. Ketteler Manual Training School [282 Ill. 504, 118 N.E. 743 (1918)],
and St. Hedwig's IndustrialSchool for Girls v. Cook County [289 Ill. 432, 124
N.E. 629 (1919)] has interpreted the words 'aid,' 'support or sustain,' and 'sectarian purpose' to yield the same results as the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the word 'establish' in the Federal First Amendment. in addition, since the testimony of legal authorities ... has indicated that the present
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independent analysis, the court concluded:
The same secular purpose, primary neutral effect and absence of
excessive government entanglement which place section 29-4
outside the prohibition of section 3 of Article X against the use of
public funds for sectarian purposes also place it outside the prohibition of Section 3 of Article I against any preference being
given by law to any religious denomination.'° 3
In a special concurring opinion, Justice Ryan stated that
although he agreed with the result, he did not equate article X,
section 3 with the first amendment. 1°4 He noted the extensive debates which accompanied the provision's addition to the constitution in 1870.105 The delegates' rejection of a substitute clause that
read like the first amendment indicated to Justice Ryan "that the
framers of the constitution of 1870 did not intend that this section
have the same meaning as the first amendment but that it be more
restrictive insofar as public aid to sectarian schools is concerned."' 10 6 Regarding the more ambiguous debates that occurred
in 1970, Justice Ryan concluded that "this subject was a controversial issue which the delegates were reluctant to face"; therefore
they sidestepped the issue by indicating that someday the court
might say that article X, section 3 means no more than the first
amendment. '
The Illinois Supreme Court was even more explicit about the
relationship between article X, section 3 and the first amendment
in People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett,""s a case involving financial
assistance for non-public elementary and secondary schools. Finding Bakalis controlling, Justice Schafer stated that:
[S]ection 3 of article X of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 imposes restrictions concerning establishment of religion that are
language is no more restrictive than the Federal language but rather yields the
same substantive results, the Committee has concluded that any program which
is constitutional under the Federal 'establishment' clause is constitutional under
the present word of ARTICLE VIII, Section 3.
Id. at 463-64, 299 N.E.2d at 744-45 (quoting RECORD OF 1970, supra note 68, at 252-53)
(citation omitted).
103. Id. at 466, 299 N.E.2d at 746. The court applied the same test used by the
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra 111 note and
accompanying text (for further discussion of the Lemon decision).
104. Bakalis, 54 I11.
2d at 472-73, 299 N.E.2d at 749 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
105. Id. at 473, 299 N.E.2d at 750 (Ryan, J., specially concurring). For a discussion
of the 1869-70 Convention debates, see supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
106. 54 I11.
2d at 474, 299 N.E.2d at 750 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
107. Id. at 476, 299 N.E.2d at 751 (Ryan, J., specially concurring). For a discussion
of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention debates, see supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
108. 56 I11.
2d 1, 305 N.E.2d 129 (1973).
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identical to those imposed by the first amendment to the constitution of the United States. Thus, any statute which is valid
under the first amendment is also valid under the constitution of
Illinois. 1o
Significantly, in construing article I, section 3 in Bakalis,I" the
court had used the three-part Lemon v. Kurtzman I test which the
United States Supreme Court employed to interpret the establishment clause of the first amendment. The court applied the same
test in PreschoolOwners Association v. Departmentof Children and
Family Services,1 2 a case in which the plaintiffs argued that the
Child Care Act of 1969, which exempted sectarian day care programs from coverage, provided a preference for religious day care
centers. Because the Act satisfied all three parts of the Lemon
test,1 13 the court concluded that it did not violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment or provide an "invalid religious pref' 14
erence under the State Constitution."
III.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS AND ASSEMBLY UNDER THE
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

There has been even less activity under the speech, press, and
assembly provisions of the Illinois Constitution than under the religion provisions. Article I, section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides: "All persons may speak, write and publish freely,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel,
both civil and criminal, the truth, when published with good mo109. Id. at 3-4, 305 N.E.2d at 130.
110. Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 465, 299 N.E.2d 737, 745-46 (1973).
See supra note 100-07 and accompanying text (for further discussion of Bakalis).
111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Supreme Court in Lemon held that
[e]very analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations omitted). See supra note 74, 103 and accompanying text (for further discussion of Lemon).
112. 119 Ill. 2d 268, 518 N.E.2d 1018, appeal dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 2861 (1988).
113. 119 Ill. 2d at 281, 518 N.E.2d at 1025. The statute had several secular purposes,
including alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Id. at 279-81, 518 N.E.2d
at 1024-25. The statute's effect neither advanced nor inhibited religion because a number
of non-religious institutions enjoyed the same benefit and the statute avoided state entanglement with religion. Id.
114. Id. at 281, 518 N.E.2d at 1025.
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tives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense." 115 The
only difference between the 1970 and the 1870 Constitution is that
the 1870 provision was more specific: "Every person may freely
' 6
speak, write and publish on all subjects." "
The 1848 Illinois Constitution's provisions on free speech were
substantively identical to the 1818 provisions governing the same
area. 1 7 Both granted broad protections to freedom of speech and
press. The provision granting the right of assembly has remained
virtually unchanged since 1818: "[t]he people have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good, to
make known their opinions to their representatives and to apply
for redress of grievances."" 8 The 1818 and 1848 Constitutions
provided for the people's right "to instruct their representatives,
and to apply to the general assembly for redress of grievances," but
in 1870 this was broadened to "to make known their opinions to
their representatives and to apply for redress of grievances. ' 119
A. Legislative History
Given the primacy of speech, press, and assembly rights in our
constitutional framework, it is surprising that these rights have received so little discussion in the various Illinois constitutional conventions. Instead of developing a new provision, the delegates in
115. ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. I, § 4.
116. ILL. CONST. OF 1870, art. II, § 4. In 1970, the delegates eliminated the last
three words, "on all subjects."
117. § 23. The printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes to
examine the proceedings of the general assembly, or of any branch of government; and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free
communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man;
and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print, on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.
ILL. CONST. OF 1848, art. XIII, § 23.
§ 24. In prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official conduct of officers, or of men acting in a public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in
evidence, and in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right of determining both the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other
cases.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 24.

118.

See ILL. CONST. OF 1970, art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 17; ILL.

CONST. OF 1848, art. XIII, § 21; ILL. CONST. OF 1818, art. VIII, § 19. The 1970 Consti-

tution inserted a comma after the word "manner" that previously was not there. For
further discussion of this change see infra text accompanying note 136.
119. Id. Each of these clauses differs substantially in wording from the first amendment, which provides succinctly that: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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1818 borrowed largely from the Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and
Indiana constitutions. 120 Some of the discussion that did occur
concerned the issue of race. Delegates to the 1847 Convention attempted to amend article VIII, section 19 of the 1818 Constitution
to include provisions that interracial marriage would be illegal and
that black persons would be prohibited from holding public office
in the state, but this amendment was soundly defeated.'
Most of the freedom of speech and press debate in the 1970 Convention centered upon the relationship between federal and. state
constitutional restrictions on the law of libel. In the seminal case
on libel law, New York Times v. Sullivan,'22 the Court held that
state tort actions for libel were subject to federal review under the
first amendment. Under the New York Times test, a public official
could not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
official conduct unless the plaintiff proved "that the statement was
made with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."' 23 The
Court subsequently
extended that opinion to protect "public
24
figures."

In Farnsworthv. Tribune Co. ,125 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the impact of New York Times on article II, section 4 of the
1870 Illinois Constitution. The plaintiff was an osteopathic physician who claimed that she was libelled by a newspaper article that
labelled her a "quack." She argued that the trial court erred by
refusing to give the following instruction to the jury based on article II, section 4: "Truth is a defense in a libel action only when
published with good motives and for justifiable ends." 126 The court
held that medical quackery was an area of "critical public concern" and that the trial court correctly refused the instruction because article II, section 4 was "federally unconstitutional ... to the
extent that it would require a defendant who had published state120. J. CORNELIUS, supra note 49, at 16.
121. PROCEEDINGS IN 1847, supra note 50, at 871. Article VIII, section 19 of the
1818 Constitution concerned freedom of assembly.
122.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).

123. Id. at 279-80.
124. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The subsequent development of the "public figure" standard was not without controversy in the Supreme
Court. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality lead by Justice
Brennan suggested that the determination should be based on the subject matter of the
publication rather than on the status of the plaintiff. Yet, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that the individual's status is determinative and that
"private individuals" do not have to meet the New York Times "actual malice" standard.
125. 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
126. Id. at 288, 253 N.E.2d at 409.
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ments about public affairs or of public interest and concern to
prove that they were true, and published with good motives and for
justifiable ends."' 27
Despite the Farnsworth opinion, a majority of the Bill of Rights
Committee recommended to retain the language of article II, section 4 of the 1870 Constitution in the 1970 Constitution. 28 A minority of the committee argued that because the libel clause of
article II, section 4 was not federally constitutional, it should be
deleted from the 1970 Constitution, or, in the alternative, the language should be changed to shift the burden to the plaintiff to establish lack of truth and deliberate malice. 29 One of the delegates
questioned whether it might not be better simply to adopt the language of the first amendment, but Elmer Gertz, the chair of the
Bill of Rights Committee, responded that because the fourteenth
amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights,
it may be that we are reaching a day when, except to create additional rights, we'll all be governed by the Federal Bill of Rights;
but that day has not been reached, and I think it is still well to
give individual citizens those rights afforded by the Illinois bill of
rights. 30
The delegates defeated a minority proposal to delete the libel
127. Id. at 292, 253 N.E.2d at 411.
128. Leonard Foster, a delegate who served on the Committee, explained the Committee's reluctance to change the law and its preference to let the law "follow its course":
It is not our intent, as was suggested in committee debate, to thumb our noses at
the Supreme Court of either Illinois or the United States, but rather since this
provision carries with it that load of baggage which the courts have added to it
and since the courts are still actively dealing with this subject, the majority felt
that rather than try to rewrite the section in terms of today's court opinions, we
would just leave it alone and let the courts deal with it as they may.
RECORD OF 1970, supra note 68, at 1400.
129. Id. at 1401-02.
130. Id. at 1403. Gertz indicated that the committee considered incorporating the
first amendment, but
for various reasons - some practical and some a matter of principle - we stood
by the language of the 1870 Constitution, in some instances the 1848 and 1818
Constitutions. In Illinois, those rights have been spelled out more fully. We felt
- we had, for example, a matter of great moment as to whether or not we would
have section 3 [freedom of religion] remain. We felt that we would unleash an
unnecessary controversy and get the Convention involved in troubles that went
beyond the troubles we already have, and so we stood by it.
We felt that there were certain elements added by the more expansive language in the Illinois bill of rights, and we felt that every protection that the
citizen has by reason of the First Amendment, of course, he would continue to
have by reason of the Illinois language and perhaps added protections in the
field of libel and perhaps in other fields.
Id. Delegate Foster added that "the committee strongly feels there is a state of Illinois.
It's the purpose of the Constitution of Illinois to describe the shape of Illinois govern-
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clause from section 4.31 Delegate Dawn Clark Netsch then moved

to insert the phrase "involving private matters and private persons," after the word "libel."' 32 This provision would have made
section 4 consistent with current United States Supreme Court decisions on the first amendment, but the proposal was defeated
33
overwhelmingly. 1
The debates clearly show that the delegates intended article I,
section 4 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution to be independent of the
federal Constitution.134 Though the delegates recognized the federal Constitution's supremacy in the event of a conflict, they also
recognized that the Illinois speech and press provisions could be
135
interpreted more expansively than their federal counterparts.
The right to assemble contained in article I, section 5 of the 1970
Constitution was the subject of some debate in the 1970 Constitutional Convention. The delegates agreed to insert a comma after
"the right to assemble in a peaceable manner,"' 136 and before "to
consult for the common good," to ensure that the right to assemble
was an independent right, not subject to qualification by any of the
succeeding phrases. 137 The Bill of Rights Committee also proposed
to insert the phrase "to associate freely" as part of section 5 to
substitute for an even more specific proposal that gave an illustrament, and, therefore, if we simply relied on the Federal Bill of Rights we would end up
with a document that was grossly incomplete." Id.
131. Id. at 1412.
132. Id. at 1413.
133. Id. In opposing the amendment, Delegate Foster stated that:
The [bill of rights] committee feels that it is not necessary or desirable to attempt to bring the existing provision fully into accord with yesterday's court
decision, but rather to let it ride by itself and let the courts do with it what they
may; and if they decide to go in another direction and go back toward what we
had in 1870, we will not have embalmed and interred in our constitution what
appears to be the current thinking in the state of the law, which as far as we can
tell is an extreme state of flux. We would oppose the restrictions suggested by
the amendment.
Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 120-33.
135. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has held that, independent of the
federal Constitution, newspaper reporters enjoy a qualified privilege under the New York
Constitution to withhold materials which, although the product of newsgathering, were
not obtained in confidence. Accordingly, these materials are not protected under New
York's Shield Law. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 72 N.Y.2d 910, 528 N.E.2d 1231,
532 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1988).
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
137. RECORD OF 1970, supra note 68, at 1480 (1970). One delegate, Father Lawlor,
explained that the "new version assures that the people have the right to assemble in a
peaceable manner, even though their purpose is other than to consult for the common
good, or to make known their opinions to their representatives, or to apply for redress of
grievances." Id. (emphasis added).
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tive list of protected groups and parties.138 Some committee members had been fearful that the clause might be used to sanction
discriminatory housing practices. 39 After receiving assurances
that this was not the case, the committee unanimously supported
the "to associate freely" provision." 4 The delegates, nevertheless,
finally voted to delete the words "to associate freely" from section
5.141

In addition, the delegates proposed to insert the words "to organize and bargain collectively," following the word "good" in section 5, but this amendment failed in a voice vote. The delegates
felt that existing language already protected that right. 42 All of
these amendments and proposed amendments demonstrate that the
delegates were interested in expanding, and not diminishing, freedom of assembly in section 5 of the 1970 Constitution.
B. Illinois Supreme Court Decisions
The Illinois Supreme Court has analyzed the freedom of speech,
press, and assembly provisions of the Illinois Constitution in relatively few cases. In an early case, People v. Apfelbaum, 143 the court
held that a state law making advertising under a false name reason
for refusing or revoking a medical license did not violate article II,
section 4 of the 1870 Constitution because
[a] citizen may advertise his business in any legitimate manner,
138.

The original proposal stated that

[t]he affirmative right of individuals, without prejudice to the common good, to
publicly and privately communicate, freely organize, and associate with others
for the purpose of protecting their inherent and inalienable rights of life, liberty,
ownership of property, and the pursuit of happiness for maintaining or furthering their common-group cultural, social, and economic interests and standards
shall forever be guaranteed by law. This affirmative right shall be understood to
apply to all types of legitimate unions, guilds, societies, sects, parties, clubs, and
other units to which the members freely and for honest and just purposes mutually choose to be identified with or to cooperate with each other, in particular
civic, political, religious, patriotic, intellectual, esthetic, scientific, professional,
trade, racial, ethnic, athletic, geographical, or similarly oriented groups. Malicious, deliberate, and unreasonable discrimination or exclusion based on prejudice such as race, color, religious belief, political creed, national origin, sex, or
other factors totally unrelated to the purpose of the association shall be
unlawful.
Id.
139. Id. at 1481.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1487. The debate indicates that the delegates considered the right to associate freely to be protected by existing language in the Illinois Constitution. Id.
142. Id. at 1489. The debate made clear that the delegates were not opposed to collective bargaining when they defeated this amendment. Id.
143. 251 11. 18, 26-27, 95 N.E. 995, 998 (1911).
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but it is a legitimate exercise of the police power in protecting the
public against the deception and fraud practiced by irresponsible
pretenders and quack doctors to require every physician to have
the license of the State Board of Health granted in his own name
and to practice or advertise under no other.'"

The court provided no analysis to support this assertion, and it did
not refer to the federal Constitution. Although the court implied
that advertising is a form of speech protected by the Illinois Constitution,145 it held that due process does not require a judicial

146
hearing when that speech is questioned.
In People v. Lloyd,' 47 defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
advocate the violent overthrow of the United States government in
violation of an extremely broad Illinois statute passed in 1919 making such advocacy illegal.' 4 The defendants argued that the statute violated article II, section 9 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution
because it did not sufficiently define what constituted an abuse of
the right of free speech. '49 The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
held that the "clear and present danger" test, enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States, limited
freedom of speech and press under section 4.150
Significantly, the court analyzed the case only under section 4

144. Id. at 26-27, 95 N.E. at 998.
145. The court stated that "[t]he part of section 6 which makes advertising under a
false name a reason for refusing or revoking a certificate does not violate sections 1, 2 or 4
of article 2 or section 22 of article 4 of the State constitution or the fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution." Id. The Illinois Supreme Court did not further develop the right to advertise as an Illinois freedom of speech issue, after the Apfelbaum
opinion and before more recent Supreme Court opinions holding that the first amendment protects commercial advertising. E.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). But see
Cordak v. Reuben H. Donnelley, Corp., 20 Ill.
2d 153 (1960), appeal denied, 365 U.S.
299 (1961) (Illinois Supreme Court upheld Dental Practice Act that restricted nature and
content of advertisements by dental laboratory technicians); People ex rel. Chicago Dental Soc'y v. A.A.A. Dental Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ill. 2d 330, 134 N.E.2d 285, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Ill.
187, 36 N.E.2d 227 (1941).
146. Apfelbaum, 251 Ill.
at 27, 95 N.E. at 998. The United States Supreme Court has
held that a judicial determination is required when first amendment rights are to be restrained. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
147. 304 Ill.
23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922).
148. Lloyd, 304 Ill. at 29, 136 N.E. at 510 (citing 1919 ILL. LAWS 420).
149. Id. at 34-35, 136 N.E. at 512.
150. Id. at 38, 136 N.E. at 513 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
In following Schenck, the court adopted the reasoning of similar holdings of the New
Jersey Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals. See State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L.
75, 91 A. 586 (1914), aff'd, 93 A. 599 (1915) (freedom to advocate sabotage during a
strike not protected by the constitution); People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175
(1902) (state constitutional rights not violated by conviction for publishing an article
advising revolution and murder).
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and not under the first amendment. It is not clear, therefore,
whether the "clear and present danger" test is still the standard for
analyzing these issues in Illinois, especially because the Supreme
Court has called the "clear and present danger" test into question
under the first amendment, at least in cases involving the advocacy
of violence.'51
One year after Lloyd, the Illinois Supreme Court held that no
person could be prosecuted, either in a civil or a criminal action,
for libel against the government. 5 2 While recognizing that any
person who, by speech or writing, seeks to persuade others to vio-late the law or to overthrow the government by force can be punished, the court held that all other utterances or publications
against the government must be considered absolutely privileged. "53
' Once again, the court premised its decision on article II,
section 4 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution and not on federal law.
In 1940, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly recognized, for the
first time, the independence of article II, section 4 in the 1870 Illinois Constitution from the first amendment. In Village of South
Holland v. Stein,1 4 the court found it unconstitutional for a village
to require door-to-door solicitors to obtain a license. 55 After examining Supreme Court opinions that analyzed whether the first
amendment invalidated similar licensing requirements, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Constitution of Illinois is even
more far-reaching than that of the constitution of the United States
in providing that every person may speak freely, write and publish
' 56
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.'
Similarly, in Montgomery Ward and Company v. United Retail
Wholesale and Department Store Employees, 57 the court held that
article II, section 4 prohibited the courts from enjoining the publi151. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Court failed to discuss Schenk in
knocking down statute outlawing speech that advocated violence as a means to obtain
reform). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) ("mere
advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the
First Amendment"); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951) (a conspiracy
to advocate overthrow of the government, even with no chance of success, constitutes the
requisite danger).
152. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 I11.
595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923) (newspaper
reported that city was "broke" and was "headed for bankruptcy").
153. 307 Ill. at 606-07, 139 N.E. at 90.
154. 373 I11.
472, 26 N.E.2d 868 (1940).
155. Id. at 480, 26 N.E.2d at 871. In Stein, the solicitors were book canvassers who
solicited subscriptions for books for future delivery.
156. Id. at 479, 26 N.E.2d at 871.
157. 400 Ill. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46 (1948).

HeinOnline -- 21 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 117 1989-1990

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 21

cation of defamatory matters. 5 8 The court again proclaimed that
article II, section 4 "is broader than that of the constitution of the
United States, which merely prohibited Congress from making any
law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. It will be noted
that [in Illinois] the person
may speak, write, or publish, being re'5 9
abuse."'
an
for
sponsible
Merely because Illinois courts had interpreted article II, section
4 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution more broadly than the first
amendment did not mean that Illinois viewed obscenity as a protected form of speech. In Cusack v. Teitel Film Corp.,' 6° defendants had argued that the Illinois Constitution protected obscenity
as a form of free expression. The defendants contended that
although obscenity is exempt from first amendment protection
under Roth v. United States, 6 ' the Illinois Constitution allows a
"broader and more permissive approach" to obscenity.162 The Illinois Supreme Court not only disagreed, it went a step further and
stated "we herewith specifically adopt the reasoning set down by
the United States Supreme Court in Roth and hold that the language of section 4 of article II of the Illinois constitution does not
extend to a protection of obscenity."' 63 Cusack is significant be158. Id. at 46, 79 N.E.2d at 50. The court suggested that persons could be punished
for libel by way of damages or criminal penalties, but the language of section 4, article II
did not adjust itself to preventive relief from a libel by way of an injunction. Id.
159. Id.
160. 38 I11.2d 53, 230 N.E.2d 241 (1967), rev'd, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390
U.S. 139 (1968). See infra note 174 and accompanying text (additional discussion of
Cusack).
161. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
162. 400 Ill. 38, 79 N.E.2d 46.
163. Id. at 59, 230 N.E.2d at 246. Actually, the Illinois Supreme Court had held in a
pre-Roth opinion that the censorship of obscene motion pictures did not violate either the
federal Constitution or article II, section 4 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution. ACLU v.
Chicago, 3 I11. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 979 (1955).
The standard articulated in ACLU anticipated the standard adopted in Roth by the
United States Supreme Court three years later.
The Illinois Supreme Court also refused to protect obscenity under the right to privacy,
contained in article I, section 6 of the 1970 Constitution, holding that this right confers
no right to possess child pornography in one's own home. People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d
313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (1988), appeal dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 299 (1988). Although this is
the majority view under state constitutions, at least two states differ. The Oregon
Supreme Court has held that obscenity is a form of speech protected by the Oregon
Constitution, State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9 (1987), and the Hawaii Supreme
Court has relied on its state constitutional right to privacy to uphold the sale of pornographic magazines. State v. Kam, 69 Hawaii 483, 748 P.2d 372 (1988).
Interestingly, in People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503
N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, rev'd, 478 U.S. 697 (1986), the New York Court of Appeals held that an order closing a business that sold adult books and that showed sexually
explicit movies, in order to curtail the illegal acts of the store's customers, violated the
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cause the Illinois Supreme Court again acknowledged that article
II, section 4 of the 1870 Constitution is independent of the first
amendment. The court simply held that in the area of obscenity,
Illinois law is the same as federal law.
With regard to free expression while on private property, some
state courts have found that the right to exercise free speech in a
modern shopping center complex exists as an independent state
constitutional right."6 Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that persons have no right to distribute leaflets in a privately-owned shopping center. 165 The court focused, however,
right to freedom of expression found in the New York Constitution. The court stated
that
in determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of
the individual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound
to exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in
the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 557, 503 N.E.2d at 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 846. The court indicated that the Bill of
Rights is merely a minimal standard, and that "[t]he function of the comparable provisions of the State Constitution, if they are not to be considered purely redundant, is to
supplement those rights to meet the needs and expectations of the particular State." Id.
According to the court, the Supreme Court's rulings on obscenity are governed by community standards, and "New York has a long history of fostering freedom of expression,
often tolerating and supporting works which in other States would be found offensive to
the community." Id.
In People v. Dietz, 1989 N.Y. LEXIS 4417, the New York Court of Appeals struck
down the state's anti-harassment statute, which prohibits "abusive" language with the
intent to "harass" or "annoy" another person. The court held that the New York Constitution provided an independent basis for its holding. Id. at *1 n.1 (citing N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 240.25 (2) (McKinney 1989)). See N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at 12, col. 1.
164. See, e.g., Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341,
153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores, 388
Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (relying on state constitutional provision protecting
access to the ballot rather than free speech). Cf Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington
Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423
A.2d 615 (1980), appeal dismissed sub nom. (1982), Princeton University v. Schmid, 455
U.S. 100 (1982) (access to private school campus); Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158,
432 A.2d 1382 (1981) (access to private school campus).
Other state supreme courts, however, have refused to interpret their constitutions to
confer such a right. Cologne v. Westfarms Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens' Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985); State v.
Folmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66
N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985); Western Pa. Socialist Workers
1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986);
Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987).
165. People v. Sterling, 52 Ill. 2d 287, 287 N.E.2d 711 (1972) (no federal constitutional right to distribute leaflets regarding racial situation in completely enclosed private
shopping mall). Although in PruneYard, the Supreme Court allowed protection of expression in a privately-owned mall to flow from state constitutional provisions, the Court
has held that the right does not exist under the first amendment. See Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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solely on property rights and did not independently analyze article
I, sections 4 and 5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.166
In Troman v. Wood,167 the Illinois Supreme Court chose to follow the minimum standard allowed by the United States Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 16S by applying the negligence
standard to non-public figure plaintiffs in defamation actions.
Gertz held that a publisher of a defamatory falsehood against a
private individual cannot claim a constitutional privilege against
liability. Furthermore, Gertz stated that so long as states do not
impose liability without fault, they may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for the publisher of a defamatory
69
falsehood against a private individual.
In Troman, the court stated that from the outset Illinois Constitutions had recognized a person's "reputation" as a fundamental
interest and that both the 1870 and the 1970 Illinois Constitutions
"recognize the interest of the individual in the protection of his
reputation, for they provide that the exercise of the right to speak
freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse
of that right."' 170 Thus because of its independent analysis of the
Illinois Constitution, the court chose to follow Gertz.
The Illinois Supreme Court may have gone beyond the Supreme
Court in defining who a public official is for purposes of public
interest discussion under New York Times v. Sullivan. 17' For example, the court unambiguously has classified a police patrolman
as a "public official"172because his duties are "highly charged with
the public interest."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The language of the Illinois Constitution, its legislative history,
166. Sterling, 52 Ill. 2d at 292, 287 N.E.2d at 714.
167. 62 Ill.
2d 184, 195, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975).
168. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Illinois Supreme Court decided to follow Gertz even
though it was not required to do so.
169. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
170. Troman, 62 Ill. 2d at 194-95, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
171. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Illinois libel law, however, receives less protection under
the state constitution than under the federal Constitution. See infra text accompanying
note 173.
172. Coursey v. Greater Niles Twp. Publishing Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 265, 239 N.E.2d
837 (1968). See M. POLELLE & B. OTrLEY, ILLINOIS TORT LAW 138-40 (1985). The

Illinois Supreme Court has not resolved whether teachers are "public officials" for purposes of applying the New York Times standard. But see Colson v. Stieg, 89 Ill. 2d 205,
213, 433 N.E.2d 246, 249 (1982) (court applied the New York Times malice standard to a
statement concerning a professor's teaching ability that was made to a four-man faculty
evaluation committee).
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and some case law indicate that the protections given to freedom of
speech, press and assembly and freedom of religion in Illinois do
not parrot the first amendment. As to whether truth is a defense in
a libel action, the Illinois Constitution may provide less protection
than the first amendment, and in this regard, Illinois law must
yield to federal law. 173 In other areas such as the regulation of
obscenity, the Illinois Constitution may track federal law. 74 There
may be other areas, however, where Illinois law will provide
greater protection than federal law. 175 Particularly for advocates
wary of the current majority on the Supreme Court, the untapped
Illinois Constitution could be an invaluable source to protect civil
liberties.
As evidenced by the Supreme Court decision on flag burning, 76
freedom of thought and speech issues can evoke lively and spirited
debate. The balance struck in first amendment cases is necessarily
tentative and uneasy. 77 The broad sweep of federal precedents ensures that in many instances it is unnecessary to reach Illinois constitutional issues. In most cases since 1970, Illinois lawyers
apparently have argued only federal law and federal cases. 178
Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that it will first
decide speech, press and assembly issues under federal law; it will
decide Illinois constitutional issues only if the Illinois laws or pracSee Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill. 2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408 (1969).
174. See Cusack v. Teitel Film Corp., 38 Ill. 2d 53, 230 N.E.2d 241 (1967). For
further discussion of the way in which Illinois treats obscenity see supra notes 160-63 and
accompanying text.
175. See Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill. 472, 26 N.E.2d 868 (1940); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Employees, 400 Ill. 38, 79
N.E.2d 46 (1948). See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text. Logically, it would be
inconsistent for the Illinois Supreme Court to hold that Bible reading in the public
schools does not violate the Illinois Constitution when, some fifty years before the
Supreme Court decided the issue under the federal Constitution, the Illinois Supreme
Court held such action did violate the state constitution. People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Educ., 245 Ill. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910). The Illinois Supreme Court would have to make
such a contradictory decision solely because the United States Supreme Court had
changed its mind about the issue or because an amendment to the federal Constitution
allowed the practice. See supra text accompanying note 86 for a discussion of Ring.
176. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989) (Texas flag desecration statute violated
flag-burning political protestor's first amendment rights).
177. See generally H. KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN AMERICA (1988).
178. Illinois lawyers should be alert that in cases involving freedom of speech, press
and assembly and freedom of religion, independent analysis should be given to the Illinois
Constitution. Illinois judges hardly can be expected to stake out an independent course if
lawyers do not direct them to do so in the first instance.
173.
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tices are found not to violate the first amendment. 79
The people of the State of Illinois, as well as all free people, will
be better off if the Illinois courts enter the debate to grapple independently with these issues. Illinois lawyers and judges have a responsibility to approach freedom of thought and freedom of speech
issues with logic and fresh insight. Rather than simply reacting to
Washington action, Illinois lawyers and judges should use their
own experience and analysis when deciding the exciting and challenging issues presented by the Illinois constitutional provisions
protecting freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and freedom of
religion." ° These freedoms are too precious, and the issues concerning them too complex, for Illinois to abdicate to the United
States Supreme Court the exclusive power to set standards for their
exercise. Illinois judges and lawyers have a duty, not only to protect federal rights, but also to protect the rights articulated in the
Illinois Constitution, independent of the federal Constitution.

179. Chicago Tribune v. Downers Grove, 125 Ill. 2d 468, 472, 532 N.E.2d 821, 822
(1988).
180. A state is not bound by the same constraints as is the Supreme Court when
adopting innovative interpretations of constitutional rights that expand individual liberties. As Justices Brandeis and Stone commented, "[it] is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may ... serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, Stone, J.J., dissenting).
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